• Philosophy

    Freedom as Coercion in Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals

    by  • December 12, 2011 • Philosophy • 0 Comments

    One must wonder what good Kant’s solution to the free will problem is when it steals from us our sense of empirical identity, dismissing such caused desires as mere appearances and then taking that which we can’t see and subjugating it to a rational prison of our own construction.

    The Groundwork seems laced throughout with the faulty notion that once individuals understand every desire, inclination or need they have is determined; that they might somehow no longer find such attachments palatable in the face of free moral law. When the laws of freedom are only those laws that we would follow when we act from reason, and when more often than not we seem to understand ourselves as existing apart from such freedom, perhaps there is more to be said for what brings value to the human experience than what is merely free or rational.

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    The Problem of Faith in Reason

    by  • November 28, 2011 • Philosophy • 2 Comments

    I’m questioning the extent to which truth has relevance for human beings.

    Our cognitive framework is such that every object must first be distilled through our subjective faculties in order for us to recognize or understand it. With this in mind, it’s easy to see the fundamental nature of truth for human beings—that is, truth is only that fiction which we hold dearest. If truth is necessarily objective, and if there exists in the world some object of this kind, then it is immediately and by definition tainted and thus made false by our senses through which we can only subjectively perceive and make sense of it.

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    We are the joke: Don Giovanni and the either-or dilemma

    by  • October 23, 2011 • Philosophy • 0 Comments

    The true spectacle of Mozart’s Don Giovanni exists not in the anti-hero’s sexual transgressions, but in the audience’s delight and subsequent moralizing therein. Da Ponte’s libretto was billed as dramma giocoso—a genre of opera that mixes elements of comedy and drama; but Mozart catalogued it as opera buffa—possibly with the understanding that its moral lesson fails to teach. Instead, the opera strikes at the very core of what it means to be what Kierkegaard called an aesthete.

    The aesthete is one who holds aesthetic considerations above all others in his moral decisions, and it is the only other choice available to human beings who think themselves unfulfilled by the ethical life. Don Giovanni, for Kierkegaard, is the idealized, exaggerated aesthete, an archetype whose life is directed not by God or moral consideration, but by what is interesting.

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    Good as Empathy, Evil as Apathy

    by  • June 28, 2011 • Philosophy • 0 Comments

    Good as a virtue has no intrinsic value, but it is given value in the context of groups. Morality is derivative of collaboration and socialization. The potential for good (and evil) are concomitantly increased as civilization advances. That’s to say, when I’m alone, I can only help or harm myself; but when I’m with two people, three people… the more people I have access to, the greater potential there is for good and evil, and both rise in equivalent proportion.

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    Genderfuck and the tragic comedy of a well-told lie

    by  • May 2, 2011 • Philosophy • 0 Comments

    There’s something about things walking into bars that’s usually cause for raucous hysterics. Whoever it is — a priest, a black guy, a blonde, etc. — the moment that mnemonic quip sounds, face muscles relax in ready anticipation for the punch line. But nobody laughs when a transvestite walks into a bar — not really, anyway. Tense patrons shift troubled in their stools, unsure of what to say or where to look. The punch line could never follow a transvestite; they violate the joke by wearing the punch line. The shock of the façade leaves little room for wit and we sit around the table in silence, smiling uncomfortably at one another under the pretense of tolerance.

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    Reason and Revelation: From Plato’s Good to Rumi’s God

    by  • April 23, 2011 • Philosophy, Theology & Religion • 0 Comments

    At age 37, Muslim philosopher and jurist Abu Hamid al-Ghazali fell into a heavy spiritual crisis, one that caused him to abruptly abandon his well-respected position as the head of the Nizamayah College in Baghdad and roam the regions of Syria and Palestine seeking revelation. After spending years in Jerusalem and Damascus, as well as making Hajj to Mecca, he returned to his hometown of Tus, where it was discovered that he had disposed his wealth, renounced philosophy, and now totally embraced the humble life of a poor Sufi mystic. Why the sudden change?

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    Psychology and language in Meno‘s paradox

    by  • April 15, 2011 • Philosophy • 0 Comments

    The eristic problem in Plato’s Meno argues that the search for knowledge is precluded before it can even start; either because one does not know what they’re looking for, or because they already know that thing they would look for (80e.2-5). In other words, I cannot search for some knowledge I don’t already know, because I don’t know what that knowledge looks like and if I came across it, I would not understand that it is the thing I sought. Further, if I already had this knowledge then I would have no reason to even begin searching for it.

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    The Peritropê and Protagoras’ Measure Doctrine in Plato’s Theaetetus

    by  • April 14, 2011 • Philosophy • 0 Comments

    The peritropê (“table-turning”) objection in Plato’s Theaetetus is a model in which the Protagorean theory of relativism, which holds that knowledge is equal to perception, is turned against itself. Plato puts forward the peritropê with the ostensible goal of exposing Protagoras’ model as contradicting itself and therefore being self-refuting. I contend that, though the peritropê [...]

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